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We study the political economy of labour market policies.  First, it is shown that tax and 
redistributive considerations lead inside workers to prefer spending on active labour market 
programmes to passive spending, e.g., on unemployment benefits.  We also show that greater 
active spending may be a feature of globalising economies.  In the empirical work, panel data 
for OECD countries are used to examine the relationship between active and passive labour 
market spending, various measures of globalisation and controls relevant for analysing the 
political economy of labour market policies.  Overall, we find that factors other than 
globalisation are more important determinants of labour market expenditures. 
 
Keywords: Active and passive labour market policies; inside workers; panel VAR estimates 






* Corresponding author.  Telephone: +61-7-5595-2220; facsimile: +61-7-5595-1160.  E-mail address: 
ngaston@bond.edu.au.  The authors are grateful to the seminar participants at Griffith University, 
the Institute of Economic and Social Research at Osaka University, the Kansai Labour Forum at the 
Kansai Institute for Social and Economic Research, Nanzan University, Otaru University of 
Commerce and the Research Institute of Capital Formation at the Development Bank of Japan for 
their comments.  In addition, conversations with Art Goldsmith, John Hillas and Jeff Kline were 
particularly helpful.  Research assistance provided by Nicholas Gaston and David Modol-Flix is 
also acknowledged.  As usual, all errors, of omission and otherwise, are attributable to the authors 
alone.   1
I.  Introduction 
Our focus in this paper is the way in which labour market policies have responded to 
political and globalising pressures.  Increased economic insecurity generates strong demands 
for remedial government policies from affected groups of workers.  Labour market 
intervention takes two forms.  Passive labour market programmes (notably, unemployment 
benefits) and the increasing use of active labour market programmes (e.g., job search or 
relocation assistance and job training), employment policies or ‘workfare’ are intended to 
address the needs of workers in increasingly globalised economies.  Thus, labour market 
programmes can act as a palliative by providing income support or by increasing the 
employability of unemployed workers. 
The reliance upon different types of labour market policies and the generosity of 
different programmes is thought to be associated with increased economic openness for a 
number of reasons.  For example, increased economic integration (via trade and investment 
liberalisation or via increased immigration) may increase workers’ fear of job dislocation, job 
competition, income risk and economic insecurity (Rodrik, 1998).  At the macroeconomic 
level, there may be a need for adjustment and reform of the traditional microeconomic and 
labour market policies.  In addition, budgetary considerations may become more important in 
a more globalised economy.  For instance, Blank and Freeman (1994) argue that some 
European countries, in the face of increased international competition, tried to reduce the 
“generosity” of their social programmes. 
The demands for certain types of labour market programmes are generally resisted by 
the owners of capital.  Passive labour market policies, such as unemployment insurance and 
income support, as well as regulations on layoffs and union rights have long been a source of 
political conflict.  The owners of capital tend to view passive labour market policies as 
having few productivity benefits, as imposing potentially significant labour market   2 
distortions and as shifting the burden of taxation onto themselves.  Policy-makers tend to 
view passive income support as weakening work incentives and extending periods of job 
search for unemployed workers.  In some countries this has motivated a shift in emphasis 
away from passive labour market policies; a public policy recommendation outlined in 
OECD (1995). 
The policy shift towards active labour market programmes is often associated with the 
removal of labour market rigidities and the increasing flexibility of labour markets.  The 
goals, of course, are durable reductions in rates of unemployment and improvements in total 
factor productivity.  On a practical level, it has been claimed that shifting emphasis away 
from passive income support for unemployed workers to active labour market programmes 
has been successful in Scandinavia, Austria and the Netherlands.
1  However, not all countries 
have redirected resources from passive to active labour market programmes.  In addition, the 
increases in active spending that have occurred have generally been quite small (OECD, 
2001); while income replacement and ‘benefit dependency’ have been trending sharply 
upwards in many countries (OECD, 2003). 
An interesting perspective is provided by Saint-Paul (2000), who argues that the most 
relevant conflict that lies at the root of modern labour market rigidities and the recent changes 
to labour market institutions is that between various types of labour, and not the more 
traditional conflict between capital and labour.  For example, rather than being driven by 
some sense of altruism towards their less fully employed compatriots, Saint-Paul argues that 
certain labour market institutions are supported by a group of employed workers or insiders 
because it allows them to increase their own wages and welfare.  In the next section we 
pursue this line of argument by extending Wright’s (1986) median voter model of 
                                                 
1 International Social Security Association (2004); see http://www.issa.int/pdf/iniative/2findings1.pdf.  On the 
other hand, Calmfors et al. (2001) argue that the different types of active labour market policies have had 
varying degrees of success in Sweden.  Overall, while active labour market policies may have reduced open 
unemployment, some of the specific programmes may also have displaced regular employment.   3
unemployment insurance.  To preview, we show that insiders, with little exposure to 
unemployment, will generally prefer a policy mix with a relatively greater emphasis on active 
labour market programmes, rather than the customary forms of income support provided to 
unemployed workers. 
Naturally enough, the growth of active labour market programmes as well as the 
relationship between passive and active labour market policies depends on a variety of effects.  
Whether labour market policy outcomes are driven by insiders or outsiders, the redistributive 
consequences of labour market policies are extremely important.  More generally, we show 
that expenditures on passive and active labour market policies are likely to be positively 
correlated.  In addition, rising expenditures on active labour market programmes may well be 
a feature of economies undergoing globalisation.  In large measure, this latter feature is 
driven by tax and budgetary considerations. 
Section II contains the paper’s empirical findings and its main contribution.  To date, 
there has been relatively little empirical work on the determinants of spending on passive and 
active labour market policies.  The few studies that are related show some sensitivity of 
different types of social expenditures to increased international trade (e.g., Burgoon, 2001; 
Gaston and Nelson, 2004).  We add to these studies by using panel data for OECD countries 
to econometrically investigate the effects of various measures of openness and controls 
relevant for analysing the labour market policy-globalisation relationship on both passive and 
active labour market policies, as well as the relationship between the policies.  The last 
section provides a broad overview and contains some concluding observations. 
II.  An Insider Model of Active Labour Market Policy 
A. Government Spending on Active Labour Market Programmes: In this section we 
extend Wright (1986) to illustrate the political determination of active labour market policies.  
To begin with we assume a population of n workers consisting of two types,  n n n o i = + .    4 
There are  i n  insiders who are always employed.  There are  o n  outsiders.  The latter workers 
may be either employed, e, unemployed, u, or in active labour market programmes, a. 
The transition probabilities between the various states for an outside worker are as 
follows.  The probability of being laid off is λ .  A proportion  p  of unemployed workers is 
randomly placed in an active labour market programme, i.e.,  ) 1 ( p −  remain  openly 
unemployed.  An outside worker finds employment with probability  θ − 1 .  For a worker in 
an active labour market programme, the probability of finding employment is  α − 1 .  We 
assume that  α θ ≥ , so that participation in a labour market programme may increase the 
probability of finding a job.
2  To summarise 
ot e= 1 ) 1 ( − − ot e λ + 1 ) 1 ( − − ot u θ + 1 ) 1 ( − − ot a α    
ot u= 1 ) 1 ( − − ot e p λ + 1 − ot u θ   (1)
ot a= 1 − ot pe λ + 1 − ot a α .   
Using the fact that  1 = + + ot ot ot a u e , the steady state probabilities for an outsider can be 
shown to be 
*
o e=
1 ) 1 )( 1 (
− − − ∆ α θ    
*
o u =
1 ) 1 )( 1 (
− − − ∆ α λ p  (2)
*
o a=
1 ) 1 (
− − ∆ θ λp ,   
where  () [] ) ( 1 ) 1 ( θ α λ θ λ α ∆ − + − + − = p .  With p = 0, the results are identical to those of 
Wright (1986).  If  α θ > , note that steady state employment increases in p.  In this paper, p is 
the decision-maker’s policy variable. 
Following Saint-Paul (1998), we assume that the compensation for unemployed 
workers equals  0 > c , whether they are in active labour market programmes or not.  For 
                                                 
2 We abstract from any productivity benefits of active labour market programmes.  In this section, intuition 
may be aided by thinking of the policy as one which facilitates worker matching or the efficiency of job search 
(as in Saint-Paul, 1998).   5
simplicity, we also assume that c is fixed, i.e., we treat it as a contractually-determined 
entitlement for an unemployed worker.  The wage for employed workers is denoted by 
) (E w w = , where  o o i e n n E + =  and  0 ≤ E w .  The tax rate on earned incomes is denoted by 
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ τ . 
The expected utility of an outsider, not conditioned on their current employment 
status, is given by 
() ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( c U e w U e V o o o − + − = τ ,        ( 3 )  
where  U(.) is a concave utility function.  The expected utility of an inside worker is 
() ) 1 ( τ − = w U Vi . 
In a steady state, the policy-maker’s balanced budget constraint is 
() ( ) p c e n w e n n o o o o i κ τ + − = + ) 1 ( ,        ( 4 )  
where the cost of administering active labour programmes is  0 > κ .  Without loss of 
generality, we assume that the latter cost does not vary with the number of unemployed 
workers placed in active labour market programmes. 
Now suppose that labour market institutions are determined by insiders.
3   Hence, 
labour market policies are chosen to maximise insiders’ post-tax incomes.  That is, p 
maximises 


















κ ) 1 (
.        ( 5 )  
The advantage of a higher p is that it reduces the total number of unemployed workers.  
The disadvantage is that it is a costlier policy.  Differentiating equation (5) with respect to p, 
setting to zero, rearranging and simplifying yields
4 
                                                 
3 A few comments on the restrictiveness of some of model’s assumptions are in order.  First, a simple way to 
endogenise c is to introduce a socially acceptable minimum payment to unemployed workers, c , say.  Clearly, 
if  c is also chosen by insiders, then  c c = * , since c does not affect the steady-state level of employment.  
Secondly, if the balanced budget condition (equation (4)) does not bind, then the p (and c) chosen by insiders 
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π  (since  0 ≥ op e ) and  ) 1 , 0 (    , ∈ = r rw c .
5 
B. The Determinants of Active Labour Market Spending: First,  * p  falls  as  π  
approaches zero.  (Note that  α θ =  and  0 = op e  implies  0 *= p .)  Hence, the more successful 
are active labour market programmes in lowering total public spending on unemployed 
workers, the greater the support for spending on active labour market policies.  This effect 
arises due to a tax effect.  Next, observe that  * p  rises in both w and ω .  The former effect 
captures the fact that higher wages increase the tax base, affording greater expenditure on 
labour market programmes.  The latter effect represents an adverse wage formation effect.  
Active labour market programmes may raise the supply of better-trained workers.  If outside 
and inside workers are substitutes, then this would increase job competition for currently 
employed workers, so that wages fall in p (see Calmfors, 1995; Calmfors and Lang, 1995).  
Thus, an adverse wage effect lowers the demand for active spending. 
Ceteris paribus, p* rises in  .    and       , α θ λ    Consequently, higher steady state 
unemployment raises the demand for active labour market policies.  Also, the more generous 
are benefits paid to unemployed workers, the greater the support for active labour market 
policies.
6  Once again, both of these latter effects are driven by tax considerations.  Next,  * p  
                                                                                                                                                        
4  Sufficient conditions for a maximum are that wages are concave in employment and that κ  is  small.  
Sufficient for  0 *> p  is  1 ≤ π  and  r − ≥ ω . 
5 r is the replacement ratio.  We substitute  rw c =  after differentiating equation (5).  The economic 
interpretation is that private agents regard c as fixed, even though the policy-maker ultimately chooses c so that 
it turns out to be a given percentage, r, of w. 
6 In this model, the relationship between spending on active and passive labour market policies is affected by 
two conflicting pressures.  On the one hand, spending on the two policies is negatively correlated due to the 
balanced budget constraint (i.e., as p* increases  *) 1 ( p −  falls).  On the other hand, spending on the two policies 
is positively correlated due to the higher benefits paid to all unemployed workers, c (i.e., equation (6)).   7
falls in  . κ   This effect captures the fact that higher costs associated with active labour market 
programmes, lower the demand for them. 
Finally, consider the effects of globalisation.  From the factor price equalisation 
theorem, the effects of integration with an unskilled labour abundant country on domestic 
labour market policies can be captured by an increase in no, i.e., an immigration of outside 
labour.  For sufficiently small values of ω , an increase in  o n  raises  * p .   I t  i s  a l s o  
straightforward to show that  0 ≥
o n π  and  0 <
o n ω  (in the latter case, as long as the demand 
for labour is not “too” convex).  The first effect serves to raise  * p , while the second effect 
serves to lower it.  The latter effect implies that increased labour market competition and an 
erosion of wages will lower the use of active labour market policies.  However, note that if 
insider’s wages, as well as their job security, are insulated from an increase in the number of 
outsiders then any adverse wage response, ω , will likely be small.  It then follows that the 
possibility of higher labour market expenditures on unemployed workers results in a shift 
towards policies that lower steady state unemployment.  Thus, globalisation, at least as it is 
measured here, would be associated with greater spending on active labour market policies. 
C. Overview: Our results are generally unsurprising, in the sense that inside workers 
will oppose any labour market policy associated with a higher tax burden.  This results from 
the binding balanced budget constraint.  For example, higher unemployment benefits imply 
higher taxes on earned incomes.  Consequently, if the employed are politically influential, 
this will lead to political pressure to reduce the generosity of benefits.  This has been termed a 
redistribution effect or tax effect (Saint Paul, 1996).  Additionally, if unemployment benefits 
are difficult to reduce, then active labour market policies which lower the steady state 
unemployment rate garner more political support.  This effect is likely to be offset by an 
exposure effect or insurance effect.  That is, the more exposed insiders are to unemployed (or   8 
in fact, if they are not the politically pivotal voters), the greater the relative preference for 
passive labour market spending.
7 
The other major finding of this section is that the responsiveness of wages to 
unemployment is also important for understanding the effects on labour market policies.   
When wages are characterised by some degree of insulation to labour market competition, 
such as in economies with strong unions, both passive and active labour market programmes 
will generally be more generous.  Albeit, for different reasons.
8 
Likewise, an increase in the efficiency of active labour market programmes, proxied 
by a reduction in κ , say, will lead to an increase in both active and passive labour market 
programmes.
9  However, if globalisation places an effective limit on the extent to which 
earned incomes can be taxed, then this implies that active and passive types of labour market 
policies are substitutes, rather than complements for one another. 
Apart from the effects of globalisation, several predominantly domestic factors 
influence the direction and level of both passive and active labour market programmes, as 
well as the relationship between them.  Tax and redistribution effects bear directly on the 
                                                 
7 It is interesting to note that if were to denote the insider population ni to be permanently unemployed, rather 
than always employed, then  . 0 *= p   This occurs because, for any given τ, a higher p reduces taxable wages and 
increases programme costs by  . dp κ   Intuitively, if outside workers were the politically influential voters, then 
p* would lie between the p chosen by the permanently employed (i.e., equation (6)) and the permanently 
unemployed (i.e., p* = 0).  More formally, outsiders maximise  ( ) [ ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( c U w U e c U o − − + τ .  The first order 
condition is  () ( ) [] 0 ) ( ) 1 ( *) ( ) 1 ( ' = − − + − − c U w U e p p w U e op
o
o τ τ , where p* is given by equation (6).  Since 
0 > op e , then  * p p
o < , i.e., outsiders would choose a lower p than insiders do. 
8 Using a lobbying model, Gaston and Nelson (2004) show that unions and employers pressure policy-makers 
to ease tax burdens and cap increases in unemployment benefits when wage bargaining is decentralised.  When 
the risk of unemployment is lower and collective bargaining is more centralised, the demand for publicly-
provided unemployment insurance is higher because workers prefer higher employment risk-higher wage 
contracts. 
9 However, this effect is weighted by  ) ( α θ − .  In fact, if active labour market programmes do not appreciably 
increase steady state employment, then the tax effect is negligible.  Government-funded training programmes in 
the United States are commonly found to have negative rates of return (e.g., LaLonde, 1995).  Specifically, 
participants are no less poor or do not have significantly lower probabilities of unemployment after completion 
of the programmes.  It seems somewhat paradoxical then, that generally speaking, government-sponsored 
training schemes are politically popular.  On the other hand, Fougère et al. (2000) find that the training 
component of French active labour market programmes has small productivity and employment effects, but that 
the programmes do lower wage costs for employers.   9
generosity of unemployment benefits and spending on active labour market programmes.  
There are also wage formation effects that are likely to be more pronounced in more 
unionised economies.  Finally, the labour market programmes themselves are interrelated.  
The connection between the policies is not only determined by the government’s budget 
constraint, but also through the way in which the labour market policies influence steady state 
unemployment rates and hence, worker welfare.  In the next section, we seek to uncover the 
empirical relationship between the types of labour market policy as well as to investigate the 
primary determinants of both active and passive labour market policies. 
III.  The Empirical Findings 
In this section, we use cross-sectional, time-series data for OECD countries to 
investigate various measures of openness, political variables and other controls relevant to 
analysing the determinants of modern labour market policies.
10  Before proceeding to the 
econometric analysis, we provide a brief overview of the times series behaviour of active and 
passive labour market policies in OECD economies.  The trends are contrasted with the time 
series behaviour of measures of economic openness.  We also provide a selective survey of 
related empirical studies to further motivate our empirical specification and facilitate 
comparison. 
A. Data preview: First, figure 1 shows the data for each country for the most recent 
year in our dataset for public spending on active and passive labour market measures.  In 
1998, as a share of GDP, expenditure on passive labour market programmes varied from a 
low of 0.25 percent (the United States) to a high of 3.37 percent (Denmark).  Expenditure on 
active labour market programmes varied from a low of 0.18 percent (the United States) to a 
high of 1.96 percent (Switzerland). 
                                                 
10 Our sample consists of the high-income OECD countries for which we could get data for both passive and 
active labour market expenditures and other relevant controls: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States.  All the data definitions and sources are described in Appendix 1.   10 
--- Figure 1 here --- 
At risk of oversimplification, in table 1 we show the broad trends in the data by 
splitting our sample into two periods: 1980-89 and 1990-1999.  Panel A of Table 1 shows 
that, for most countries, spending on labour market programmes grew in the majority of 
countries.  Passive spending fell in 9 of the 16 countries in our sample.  In addition, 
comparing the two decades, active labour market programmes became more important than 
traditional income support programmes in 11 countries.  We also note that average 
unemployment rates were higher in 11 of the 16 countries for the 1990s.  The latter fact has 
been identified as a reason why policy-makers may have been reluctant, or unable, to further 
reduce passive labour market spending (OECD, 2001). 
Comparing decades again, panel B of table 1 shows that the measures of globalisation 
display increases for nearly all countries over the same period.  This suggests that increases in 
trade openness, FDI, portfolio investment and migration may have been associated with 
increases in labour market expenditures, and with the rise of active labour market 
programmes, in particular. 
--- Table 1 here --- 
B. Previous Studies: While there are numerous theoretical papers on the likely 
determinants of active and passive labour market policies, there are few empirical 
contributions.  What empirical research has been done has tended to focus, perhaps 
understandably, on the determinants of unemployment benefits or unemployment insurance.  
To our knowledge, there are almost no studies which examine the determination of both 
passive and active labour market policies. 
Saint-Paul (1996) uses panel data for OECD countries to examine the main 
determinants of unemployment benefits.  In particular, he examines the relative importance of 
an exposure or insurance effect, i.e., the exposure of the employed to unemployment, and a   11
wage formation effect.  Saint-Paul finds stronger evidence for the latter effect, i.e., the more 
inelastic is labour demand, the more generous are unemployment benefits.  Fiscal effects, 
measured by the gross government debt to GDP ratio, are also statistically significant. 
Extending Saint-Paul (1996), Gaston and Nelson (2004) use panel data to investigate 
whether trade openness and labour market institutions can also help explain within- and 
between-country differences in unemployment benefit entitlements.  They find that both left-
wing governments and the widespread coverage of workers by union bargaining raise 
unemployment benefits.  These results are consistent with those in the large empirical 
literature in comparative political economy which focusses on the link between labour market 
institutions, political orientation and welfare state outputs (e.g., Garrett, 1998; Swank, 2002).  
Gaston and Nelson also find evidence of a positive relationship between trade openness and 
unemployment benefits, but a negative relationship between openness interacted with the 
budget deficit and unemployment benefits.  This suggests that an increase in government 
indebtedness lowers the responsiveness of the benefit replacement rate to openness.  That is, 
there is some evidence that globalisation acts as a constraint on the political economy of 
labour market outcomes. 
The latter result is consistent with Rodrik’s (1997, p.62) somewhat pessimistic 
perspective on globalisation.  While he finds a significant positive correlation among cross-
sectional measures of openness and welfare for OECD countries, panel data for the same set 
of countries suggest the opposite.  That is, trade openness is significantly correlated with 
sizable reductions in social transfers, as is capital openness, albeit less so.  Further, the 
interaction of trade and capital openness is correlated with even more significant reductions 
in welfare spending. 
Burgoon (2001) provides an interesting analysis of various components of labour 
market and social expenditures.  He hypothesises that the nature of politics will be more   12 
consensual when it comes to the effects of globalisation on the components of social 
expenditure which enhance labour productivity.  On the other hand, the conflict between 
capital and labour over policies which have no obvious productivity benefits, such as 
traditional forms of income support, implies that greater openness will have indeterminate 
effects.  Overall, Burgoon finds that various measures of openness have a small effect on 
welfare outcomes and that openness is far from the most important determinant of welfare 
efforts in OECD countries.  However, he does find evidence that training and relocation 
expenditures are “less constrained” by various measures of openness than are social 
expenditures, such as retirement benefits, health-care and family benefits. 
D. Panel VAR: In this section, we econometrically investigate the determinants of 
government spending on active and passive labour market policies using panel data for 16 
OECD countries and 20 years, 1980 to 1999. 
Unit root tests, described in Appendix 2, suggest that our data are stationary.  Hence, 
we estimate a panel vector autoregressive (VAR) model to analyse the determinants of 
spending on labour market policies.
11  The multivariate VAR(q) model with fixed effects 
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where Active and Passive are, respectively, measures of government spending on active and 
passive labour market programmes for country i (=1, …, N) at time t (=1, …, T).   j t i X − ,  is 
comprised of lagged exogenous variables.  In particular, we include variables suggested by 
the theory developed in the previous section, e.g., government indebtedness which captures 
tax effects, as well as measures of globalisation (trade openness, FDI, portfolio capital flows 
and migration), unionisation and an indicator of the political orientation of the government.  
                                                 
11 We estimate a panel VAR model in preference to a panel vector error correction model, which requires that 
variables are non-stationary and cointegrated.   13
(Variable construction and the data sources are described in Appendix 1.)   i η  is a country-
specific fixed effect,  t φ  is a time effect and  t i, ε  is a multivariate normally distributed random 
disturbance.  A fixed effects model, rather than a random effects model is estimated, as the 
i η ’s are likely to represent omitted country-specific characteristics which are correlated with 
other explanatory variables.
12 
The system of equations described by equation (7) assumes that the random error 
terms are orthogonal to the country fixed effects and the time effects, as well as the lagged 
values of the endogenous variables.  Further, the errors are assumed to have positive variance 
and to be uncorrelated across cross-sectional units and time.  However, due to the likely 
correlation between the lagged endogenous variables and the fixed effects in equation (7), the 
least squares dummy variable estimator produces biassed parameter estimates.  Accordingly, 
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where ∆ is the first difference operator, e.g.,  1 , , , − − = ∆ t i t i t i X X X . 
Since the transformed lagged endogenous variables and the transformed error terms 
in equation (8) may be correlated in panels with a limited time dimension (see Nickell, 1981; 
Kiviet, 1995), we estimate the coefficients in equation (8) by the generalised methods of 
moments (GMM) technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  This technique uses the 
pre-determined lags of the system variables as instruments to exploit a potentially large set of 
over-identifying restrictions and provides consistent coefficient estimates (see Bond, 2002). 
The errors in equation (8) satisfy the following orthogonality conditions 
1     , 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , , , , − < ∀ = ∆ = ∆ = ∆ t s X E Passive E Active E t i s i t i s i t i s i ε ε ε .   (9) 
                                                 
12 Hsiao (1986) shows that the generalised least squares estimator for the random effects model, under an 
assumption of independence between the fixed effects and the explanatory variables, is biassed.   14 
Assuming serially uncorrelated errors, the orthogonality conditions imply that the vector of 
instruments available to identify the parameters of equation (8) has the form 
] ,..., ; ,..., ; ,..., [ 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , , i t i i t i i t i t i X X Passive Passive Active Active Z − − − = .   (10) 
Letting 
*
i Z   be a block diagonal matrix whose t
th block is given by equation (10), for 
2 ,..., 1 − = T t , the matrix of instruments for each equation of the VAR is  ) ,..., (
* *
1 ′ = N Z Z Z . 
The one-step GMM estimator for the  1 × k  coefficient vector for each equation of the 
VAR in equation (8) is given by
13 
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with H a  2 − T  square matrix with 2’s on the main diagonal, -1’s on the first sub-diagonal 
and 0’s elsewhere, and 
* ~
X  is an  k q T N × − − ) 1 (  design matrix stacked by cross-sectional 
units with typical row 
] , ,..., , ,..., , ,..., [
~
, 1 , , 1 , , 1 ,
*
, t q t i t i q t i t i q t i t i t i X X Passive Passive Active Active X φ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ = − − − − − − . (12) 
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where  ∑




i i i i N Z Z N V ε ε
1  and the  i ε ∆ ’s are the GMM residuals. 
                                                 
13 Bond (2002) notes that most applied work using GMM employs the one-step estimator rather than the two-
step estimator.  Arellano and Bond (1991) use simulations to show that only modest efficiency gains result from 
using the two-step procedure, even in the presence of heteroscedasticity.   15
C. The results 
The optimal lag length q is determined by nested likelihood ratio tests.
14  In all cases, 
we find that  1 = q  is optimal.  The GMM estimates for the panel VAR(1) are reported in 
tables 2 and 3.  For  3 > T  the model is over-identified and the validity of the assumptions 
used to estimate equation (8) can be tested using the standard GMM test of over-identifying 
restrictions or a Sargan test.  From the Sargan test statistics and the p-values reported in 
tables 2 and 3, the null hypothesis that the moment conditions are valid (i.e., equation (9)) is 
unable to be rejected.  In this context, the key identifying assumption that there is no serial 
correlation in the  it ε   disturbances can be tested by testing for no second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
15   The results 
generally show the absence of serial correlation and that the estimated models satisfy the 
standard assumptions.
16 
--- Tables 2 and 3 here --- 
In table 2, we present estimates for two measures of spending on active and passive 
labour market policies.  They represent alternative ways of normalising labour market 
expenditures by the size of an economy.  In the second and third columns, we report the 
results for nominal labour market expenditures divided by nominal GDP.  In the fourth and 
fifth columns, we report the results for real labour market expenditures divided by the size of 
the labour force.  As can be quickly gathered from the sign patterns of the significant results, 
                                                 
14 The correct lag length is critical for the panel VAR since excessively short lags may fail to capture the 
system’s dynamics, lead to omitted variables, bias the remaining coefficients and be likely to produce serially 
correlated errors.  On the other hand, too many lags lead to a rapid loss of degrees of freedom and to over-
parameterisation.  See Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) for more detail about the nested likelihood test for lag length 
selection. 
15  Negative first-order serial correlation is expected in the first-differenced residuals if  it ε  is  serially 
uncorrelated. 
16   In addition, note that the asymptotic standard errors reported in tables 3 and 4 are robust to 
heteroscedasticity (see Arellano and Bond, 1991).  However, as a check we regress the squared residuals on the 
independent variables for each of the estimated models.  Wald tests indicate homoscedastic errors.  For the sake 
of brevity, these test results are not presented here.  (The results are available from the authors upon request.)   16 
both measures paint essentially the same picture.  In table 3, we focus our attention on the 
share of active labour market spending as a proportion of all labour market spending.  The 
results in table 3 are particularly useful for discerning the factors which have lead 
governments to prefer one type of labour market programme over another.  (Also, the model 
specification used for table 3 is more directly relevant to the theory developed in section II.) 
First, labour market expenditures on both active and passive measures are path 
dependent.  This possibly reflects the persistence of spending on entitlement programmes and 
the quasi-contractual nature of some types of social policies.  Passive expenditures and 
traditional forms of income support for unemployed workers spring to mind in this regard.  
More interesting, is the fact that higher active expenditures tend to result in lower passive 
expenditures.  This seems consistent with the OECD’s policy recommendation that active 
spending replace passive spending.  More difficult to explain is the finding that lagged 
changes in passive spending are unrelated to subsequent active spending.  Once again, this 
may point to the general difficulty of reducing passive spending prior to introducing new 
active labour market policies.  In addition, the quid pro quo for achieving reductions in 
passive spending seems to be increased active spending. 
Tax/Budget effects: These effects are crucial elements of political economic theories 
of government spending on various policies.  They are central to the papers surveyed in sub-
section B above, as well as the simple theory exposited in section II.  Each country’s budget 
acts as a hard constraint on labour market spending on active and passive programmes.   
Higher  Debt lowers both active and passive expenditures.  Table 3 reveals that higher 
government indebtedness is particularly constraining for passive labour market expenditures. 
However, we find that the unemployment rate, UR, is insignificant in both tables 2 
and 3.  This was expected.  As Wright (1986) points out, the generosity of unemployment 
benefits is influenced by two conflicting motives.  The demand for insurance and income   17
support rises with any factor which increases the risk of unemployment for inside workers.  
In contrast, higher unemployment benefits imply higher taxes on earned incomes.   
Consequently, if insiders are politically influential, this will lead to political pressure to 
reduce the generosity of benefits.  This is the redistribution effect or tax effect, as termed by 
Saint-Paul (1996).  That is, economies with higher steady state unemployment rates cannot 
afford to have generous unemployment benefits. 
The findings for the Dependency ratio are also very interesting.  This variable is 
measured as the percentage of the population younger than fifteen years or older than sixty-
four years.  In the political economy literature (Burgoon, 2001, e.g.), a higher Dependency 
ratio is thought to be positively correlated with spending on policies directed at the elderly or 
the young (such as retirement benefits or family benefits, respectively).  The results indicate 
that a greater Dependency ratio is associated with higher passive spending and lower active 
spending.  For OECD countries, since the higher values of the Dependency ratio are likely to 
be positively correlated with older workforces, we speculate that our findings reflect the fact 
that active spending has lower potential returns for economies with demographically older 
workforces.  That is, in such economies support for unemployed workers may be more 
optimally directed at traditional income support rather than retraining and job search 
assistance. 
Exposure/Insider and Wage effects: Obviously central to our theory is that labour 
policy outcomes are largely driven by the preferences of insiders.  Saint-Paul (1996, p.310) 
notes that one typically expects unemployment benefits to decrease with the unemployment 
level, but to increase with the change in unemployment, DUR.  As mentioned, the former 
effect captures a tax effect.  If the level of unemployment is controlled for, Saint-Paul argues 
that the latter effect captures the exposure of currently employed workers to the risk of 
unemployment.  The findings in table 2 are consistent with this line of argument, in the sense   18 
that greater insider exposure stimulates demand for greater expenditures on all programmes 
devoted to the unemployed, i.e., both active and passive measures.  Table 3 further indicates a 
shift in workers’ preferences towards relatively greater insurance and passive spending, the 
more exposed employed workers become to the risk of unemployment (a result consistent 
with both Wright, 1986 and Saint-Paul, 1996). 
The effects on labour market policies of the percentage of the workforce that is 
unionised can be thought to capture both insider and wage effects.  To the extent that Union 
is positively correlated with insulating workers from the rigours of competitive labour 
markets, the Union effect should boost both passive and active spending.  As in Gaston and 
Nelson (2004), Union boosts passive spending because higher unemployment benefits 
increase the value of the union worker’s threat point in a bargaining game with employers, 
increasing the negotiated wage.  Additionally, the theory in section II suggests that Union 
will insulate the wages of inside workers from the greater labour market competition that 
results from the workers graduating from active labour market programmes.  Table 3 reveals 
that these effects may be largely compensatory when it comes to the share of active spending 
in total spending. 
Globalisation effects: Our results for the four variables which are used to capture the 
effects of globalisation are uniform in the sense that they have no statistically significant 
effect on labour market expenditures.  At most, the effects of Migration may have resulted in 
a slight and marginally significant shift towards spending on passive programmes.  In line, 
with the section II theory, the overall absence of globalisation effects may reflect the 
offsetting wage and employment effects of active labour market policies.  However, it seems 
safer to conclude that the various measurable elements of globalisation have had no 
indiscernible effects on the formation of labour market policies.  To the extent that we have   19
been able to identify factors which have driven changes in labour market policies, they are 
not the factors directly related to the internationalisation of economies and labour markets.
17 
Politics and partisan effects: Finally, we found that our political variable had no 
statistically significant effect on labour market policy formation.  In some sense, this is one of 
our more unexpected results because Left is normally associated with policies which are more 
favourable to labour.  There are also anecdotes which seem to indicate distinctly different 
political preferences for labour market policies of governments of varying persuasion.
18  On 
the other hand, the fact that the reform of labour market policies seems to have been 
occurring independently of partisan politics may reflect the ultimate importance of budgetary 
and fiscal considerations. 
Sensitivity analysis: In this sub-section, we discuss the results of tests that were 
performed to check the robustness of our results.  To see how sensitive our results are to 
pooling the OECD countries, we first delete each country one at a time and compare the 
resulting model with the results reported in tables 2 and 3.  Overall, this procedure did not 
affect any of the signs of the coefficients reported in the tables. 
Unsurprisingly, however, due to the smaller sample sizes, the regression results are 
somewhat sensitive to country exclusions.  Depending on the country, the coefficients of 
some variables became statistically significant, while others became statistically insignificant.  
(It is important to reiterate that there were no sign reversals.)  These results are summarised 
in Appendix table 2. 
                                                 
17 We chose not to tabulate the results which show that the general pattern of insignificant results for the 
globalisation variables pertains when the openness measure is replaced by import penetration and the export-
output ratio, and the measures for direct and portfolio investment flows are disaggregated into inflow and 
outflow measures. 
18 For example, prior to the change of government in 1996, Australia's share of active labour market measures 
in total labour market expenditures was similar to that for many other OECD countries.  Following a change of 
government in 1996, expenditures on labour market programmes were halved and the operation of labour 
market programmes was privatised.  See http://www.reformmonitor.org/index.php3?mode=status.   20 
To illustrate how to interpret Appendix table 2, consider deleting the Netherlands 
(NL) from the sample.  Doing so makes the coefficient for the Dependency ratio statistically 
insignificant in the Active spending to GDP ratio equation.  In addition, the coefficient for UR 
becomes statistically significant in the Passive spending to GDP ratio equation.  Hence, one 
could conclude that the dependency ratio is a particularly important determinant of active 
spending for the Netherlands.  Using a similar argument, the unemployment rate is an 
insignificant factor driving changes in passive spending for the Netherlands.  Overall, what is 
immediately obvious from Appendix table 2 is that our most robust results are for those 
reported in table 3.  That is, the conclusions that were drawn about the determinants of the 
relative importance of active spending in total labour market spending are the most defensible. 
Appendix table 3 contains estimates for the EU country and non-EU country sub-
samples.  (For comparison, the pooled sample results from table 3 are repeated in column 2.)  
Not only does this allow further investigation of the effects of pooling the data, but doing so 
also enables us to examine whether countries in the EU behave significantly differently in 
political terms than their non-EU counterparts.  An obvious difference in the estimates for the 
two samples, that require a caveat to be placed on the conclusions drawn above, is that 
Openness does appear to have played some role in the use of active labour market policies in 
EU countries.  Also, conservative governments in non-EU countries apparently favour the use 
of active rather than passive labour market spending. 
IV.  Discussion and concluding comments 
This paper has been concerned with passive and active labour policies, their 
determinants and the relationship between them.  In particular, we have focussed on the 
impact that different elements of globalisation may have had on policies to help the 
unemployed.  There are two competing perspectives on the relationship between the welfare 
state and globalisation.  The first is that globalisation places considerable stress on the   21
welfare state, so that some social and labour market policies will display tendencies of a “race 
to the bottom”.  The effect of globalisation on certain types of workers, particularly organised 
labour, is also generally taken to be negative.  Consequently, this may have negative 
consequences for the welfare state.  For instance, Tanzi (1995) argues that increased mobility 
of capital not only erodes the tax base, reducing the welfare state’s ability to fund its 
programmes, but by shifting taxes onto labour, the capacity of the State to redistribute is 
reduced.  In a similar fashion, Garrett (1998) has argued that, by forcing welfare states to turn 
increasingly to borrowing to fund programmes, the international  capital market ends up 
imposing an increasing premium on large welfare states.  In ways that are harder to quantify, 
but seem prima facie plausible, the decreasing cost of the exit option increases the relative 
power of business in policy-making (Huber and Stephens, 1998).  Finally, it has been argued 
that globalisation increases the general credibility of orthodox (i.e., market-oriented) policy 
advice, thus reducing the plausibility of arguments supporting welfare state expansion and 
enhancing the credibility of arguments in favour of welfare state retrenchment (Krugman, 
1999). 
The opposing view is that social policies, including labour market policies, respond in 
ways such as to minimise any adverse consequences of globalisation for vulnerable workers.  
A similar argument is that the classic, large welfare states developed in the context of 
considerably more open economies than did the smaller, market conforming welfare states 
(Huber and Stephens, 1998).  A plausible story advanced by some authors is that more 
generous unemployment benefits and changes to cash transfer and income tax systems have 
arisen to ensure acquiescence by the potential losers from globalisation and microeconomic 
reforms, such as trade liberalisation (e.g., Rodrik, 1998).  That is, greater “progressive” 
redistribution may be “the price to pay” for political or social compliance with the labour 
market and microeconomic reforms necessitated by globalisation.   22 
Interestingly, Bordo et al. (1999) carry this argument further, suggesting that the 
presence of sizable welfare states, and Keynesian macroeconomic policy, may have played an 
important role in providing sufficient indifference to globalisation, that policies like support 
for the GATT/WTO system and the Bretton Woods institutions continued even in the face of 
recessions that might have had system closing consequences in earlier eras.  In addition, it 
has been widely argued that heterogeneity of domestic political, as well as labour market, 
institutions support heterogeneity of responses to globalisation (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; 
Garrett, 1998; Swank, 2002). 
In this paper, we provided a simple theoretical model that shows that the growth of 
active labour market programmes as well as the relationship between passive and active 
labour market policies depends on a variety of effects.  All workers have a view to their 
employment status and the probability of future spells of unemployment, their earned 
incomes, the wage formation effects of the government’s policies and the tax burdens 
necessary to fund new and existing labour market programmes.  In particular, when labour 
market policy outcomes are driven by insiders, the redistributive consequences of spending 
on labour market policies become extremely important.  Tax effects bear directly on the 
generosity of unemployment benefits and the extent of active labour market programmes.  
We also showed that, once again due to tax and budgetary considerations, the rise in active 
labour market programmes may well be a feature of economies undergoing globalisation. 
Finally, it was shown that passive and active labour market programmes are 
interrelated.  The relationship between the spending policies is not only determined by the 
government’s budget constraint, but also through the way in which the labour market policies 
influence steady state unemployment rates and hence, worker welfare. 
In the empirical section of the paper, we used data for 16 OECD countries to estimate 
a panel VAR model to investigate the relationship between both passive and active labour   23
market policies, various measures of openness and controls relevant for analysing the labour 
market policy-globalisation relationship.  We found a number of factors to be important.  For 
example, a determinant of the reliance upon active rather than passive spending policies, and 
a feature of economies that was devoted insufficient attention in this paper, seems to be the 
demographic structure of each country’s labour force. 
More importantly, for the purpose of this paper at least, our findings provide support 
to the view that globalisation has had at best only a very modest effect on the formation of, 
and relationship between, passive and active labour market policies.  Other effects appear to 
be more important.  For example, the extent of government indebtedness and the exposure of 
employed workers to the risk of unemployment seem particularly important.  The statistical 
significance of these two determinants are indicative of the central role played by the burden 
of taxation and the redistributive consequences associated with different types of labour 
market policies.   24 
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Note: Data are for active and passive labour market programmes as percentages of GDP.  Data are for 1998, except for AL, CA and US 
where the data are for 1999.   28 
 
Table 1 
A.  Trends in Labour Market Programmes and Unemployment Rates (averages) 
  Active Passive  Active ÷ Passive  UE rate 
  1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99 
AL 0.33  0.55 1.07 1.39 0.31 0.40 7.23 8.60 
AU 0.27  0.36 0.83 1.06 0.33 0.35 3.30 3.82 
BE  1.33 1.29 3.17 2.73 0.43 0.47 11.12  11.35 
CA 0.44  0.55 1.77 1.54 0.25 0.39 9.31 9.49 
DK 0.91  1.59 4.55 4.41 0.21 0.37 8.08 7.61 
FN 0.97  1.51 1.09 3.28 0.97 0.51 4.82  11.74 
FR 0.75  1.17 2.14 1.88 0.35 0.63 9.05  11.17 
GE 0.84  1.34 0.81 1.46 1.05 0.95 6.06 7.78 
IR  1.46 1.41 3.13 2.51 0.47 0.57 14.00  12.10 
JA 0.16  0.18 0.39 0.33 0.59 0.52 2.50 3.04 
NL 0.88  1.16 3.05 2.85 0.30 0.41 9.79 6.11 
NW 0.60  1.08 0.61 1.08 0.90 1.09 2.75 4.81 
SW 1.65  2.39 0.74 2.09 2.32 1.20 2.72 7.52 
SZ 0.14  0.46 0.20 0.95 0.85 0.64 0.61 3.14 
UK  0.69 0.48 1.40 0.83 0.55 0.63 9.67 8.08 
US 0.18  0.20 0.57 0.40 0.34 0.53 7.17 5.72 
   29
 
B.  Trends in Globalisation (averages) 
 Openness FDI  Portfolio  investment  Migration 
  1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99 
AL 33.04  38.47  2.77 2.65 2.66 4.29 6.80 4.65 
AU 74.16  79.11 0.58  1.98 3.12 8.48 1.33 5.72 
BE 133.15  136.61 2.90  18.98 6.49 44.00 0.09  1.52 
CA 52.48  67.48 2.24  3.89 3.44 4.91 4.49 6.40 
DK 67.72  67.44  0.89  5.04 1.46 5.29 0.69 2.50 
FN 56.70  60.79 1.25  5.48 2.25 7.22 0.69 1.10 
FR 43.85  44.64 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.92  1.03 
GE  54.97 51.61 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.007 3.40  5.33 
IR 106.86  134.42 -  7.04 4.52  30.88 -5.67  1.93 
JA  23.39 18.15 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.06 -0.04 
NL 107.02  108.16 4.78  10.48 3.34 12.23 1.77  3.16 
NW 75.20  71.97  1.50  3.70 2.02 3.91 1.41 2.21 
SW 64.10  68.43 2.58  9.28 0.57 5.32 1.72 2.41 
SZ 71.54  70.63  3.50  7.31 9.33 9.86 3.25 3.75 
UK 52.33  53.40 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.42  1.41 
US 18.77  22.47 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 2.76  3.31 
Note: Abbreviations: Australia (AL), Austria (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Finland (FN), France (FR), Germany (GE), Ireland 
(IR), Japan (JA), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NW), Sweden (SW), Switzerland (SZ), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).  
Data sources and all variable definitions are described in the Appendix 1. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Active and Passive Labour Market Expenditures 
(Panel VAR(1) estimates of equation (8) 
a)) 
  Expenditures/GDP  Real Expenditures per capita 
 
  Active  Passive  Active  Passive 
Constant 0.025**  0.03***  0.09***  0.18*** 
 (0.009)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Active (-1)  0.50***  -0.19**  0.54***  -0.21*** 
 (0.13)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.07) 
Passive (-1)  0.06  0.73***  0.13  0.79*** 
 (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
Tax/Budget effects 
UR (-1)  -0.004  -0.04  -0.04  -0.06 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
Debt (-1)  -0.004*  -0.01***  -0.01*  -0.04*** 
 (0.0025)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.01) 
Dependency ratio (-1)  -0.06*  0.08***  -0.24**  0.19* 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
Exposure/Insider & Wage effects 
DUR (-1)  0.01*  0.12***  0.03*  0.41*** 
 (0.006)  (0.03)  (0.016)  (0.08) 
Union (-1)  0.01***  0.03***  0.04***  0.14*** 
 (0.003)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Globalisation 
Openness (-1)  -0.003  -0.0003  -0.006  -0.006 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.01) 
FDI (-1)  -0.063  -2.49  -2.54  -9.42 
 (0.74)  (2.98)  (2.17)  (8.73) 
Portfolio investment (-1)  -0.05  -0.02  -0.05  0.26 
 (0.06)  (0.33)  (0.34)  (1.39) 
Migration (-1)  0.003  0.01**  -0.0008  0.03 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Politics 
Left (-1)  -0.03  -0.006  -0.07  0.07 
 (0.02)  (0.009)  (0.09)  (0.06) 
Diagnostic tests 
b) 
Sargan statistic  173.1  176.1  164.6  173.1 
Sargan p-value   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 
AR(1) -1.56  -1.61  -1.77*  -2.07** 
AR(2) -1.34  -1.28  -0.95  -1.18 
Notes: a) Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote rejection of null of zero 
restriction at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively; 
b) Sargan statistic tests over-identifying restrictions (asymptotically chi-squared distributed).  AR(1) 
and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation (asymptotically standard 
normally distributed).   31
Table 3. Determinants of Share of Active Spending 
(Panel VAR(1) estimates of equation (8) 
a)) 
 
  Active/LMP Expenditures 
Constant -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Active/LMP (-1)  0.76*** 
 (0.04) 
Tax/Budget effects 
UR (-1)  0.00003 
 (0.003) 
Debt (-1)  0.002*** 
 (0.0006) 
Dependency ratio (-1)  -0.02*** 
 (0.007) 
Exposure/Insider & Wage effects 
DUR (-1)  -0.01*** 
 (0.003) 
Union (-1)  -0.0003 
 (0.002) 
Globalisation 
Openness (-1)  0.0002 
 (0.0006) 
FDI (-1)  -0.28 
 (0.23) 
Portfolio investment (-1)  0.09 
 (0.07) 
Migration (-1)  -0.005* 
 (0.003) 
Politics 








a) Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote 
rejection of null of zero restriction at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively; 
b) Sargan statistic tests over-identifying restrictions (asymptotically 
chi-squared distributed).  AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order 
and second order serial correlation (asymptotically standard 
normally distributed). 
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Appendix 1.  Variable description and data sources 
Dependent variables: The data for spending on labour market programmes are from the 
OECD’s  Social Expenditure Database.  Active is spending on active labour market 
programmes.  This category includes spending on: labour market training, youth measures, 
subsidised employment, employment measures for disabled and employment service and 
administration.  Passive is primarily unemployment compensation.  We use three measures of 
Active and Passive.  The first is expenditure on active or passive labour market programmes 
expressed as a percentage of GDP (SNA93).  The second is real expenditure on active or 
passive labour market programmes (at constant 1995 prices and PPPs in U.S. dollars) divided 
by the labour force.  The third is expenditure on active labour market programmes expressed 
as a percentage of total labour market expenditures.  The size of the labour force is calculated 
by multiplying each country’s population (taken from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS)) by its labour force participation rate (obtained from the OECD’s Structure or 
composition of certain economic aggregates). 
Independent variables: Tax and Budget variables: Debt is measured as consolidated central 
government gross debt as a fraction of GDP.  The source is Robert J. Franzese, Jr., "The 
Political Economy of Public Debt: An Empirical Examination of the OECD Postwar 
Experience" paper for the Wallis Conference on Political Economy, Northwestern University, 
November 1998.  The Dependency ratio is measured as (1 – the percentage of the population 
aged from 15 to 64 years of age).  The latter data are from OECD’s Labour Force Statistics, 
1980-2000.  UR is unemployment as a percentage of total labour force (from the OECD).  
Insider effects are proxied by the change in the unemployment rate (see Saint-Paul, 1996). 
Globalisation variables:  Openness is measured as (Total exports of goods and services + 
total imports of goods and services)/GDP.  FDI is from IFS and is measured as (Direct 
Investment Abroad + Dir. Invest. in Rep. Econ.)/GDP.  Portfolio investment is from IFS and 
is measured as (Portfolio Investment Assets + Portfolio Investment Liab.)/GDP.  GDP data 
are from OECD’s, Annual National Accounts - Comparative tables based on exchange rates 
and PPPs.  Migration data are from OECD’s Labour Force Statistics, 1980-2000. 
Wage effects are captured by Union which is measured by the total union membership (less 
self-employed) weighted by the total dependent workforce.  Data for European countries are 
from the CD-Rom accompanying Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Jelle Visser, eds. (2000), Trade 
Unions in Western Europe since 1945, London: Macmillan.  Data for Australia, Canada,   33
Japan and the United States are from Miriam Golden, Michael Wallerstein and Peter Lange 
(1998), “Union Centralization among Advanced Industrial Societies”, National Science 
Foundation. 
Political or partisan effects are proxied by Left.  Left = 1 if there is right-wing domination in 
both government and parliament; = 2 if right-wing or centre parties make up between 33.3% 
and 66.6% of government; = 3 if centre parties make up 50% or more of government; = 4 if 
left-wing or centre parties make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of government; and = 5 if left-
wing parties dominate the government.  These data are from Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman 
and Ian Budge (1998), “Party Government in 20 democracies: an update (1990-1995)”, 
European Journal of Political Research 33, pp.125-64.   34 
Appendix 2.  Panel unit root tests 
As with pure time series regression analysis, the asymptotic distributions of the estimators in 
panel regressions are likely to be affected by the presence of unit roots.  This is especially 
likely in datasets with relatively long time series and short cross-sectional dimensions.  Hence, 
as precursor to our econometric analysis, we examine the stationarity of our data.  The 
variables we use for our econometric analysis are described in detail in Appendix 1. 
We test for unit-roots using the test proposed by Im et al. (2003) (henceforth, IPS).
19  
Using obvious notation, the heterogeneous panel data model is given by 
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The null hypothesis to test for unit roots is given by  0 : 0 = i H β , for all i, 0 : 1 < i H β , for 
some  i.  Based on equation (A.1), each individual component of the panel is estimated 
separately by OLS and then the test statistics are obtained as studentised averages of the test 
statistics for each equation.  The number of lags,  i q , in the model is determined by the 
Akaike Information Criteria.
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The t-statistic proposed by IPS is defined as the average of the individual ADF τ -
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The critical values for the t -statistic are obtained by stochastic simulation using 100,000 
replications. 
The IPS panel unit root test results are reported in Appendix table 1.  The statistics 
suggest that the data are stationary.  Hence, we estimate a panel vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model to analyse the determinants of labour market policies in preference to a panel vector 
error correction model (which requires that variables are non-stationary and cointegrated).
21 
                                                 
19 Unlike the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the power of the IPS panel unit root test increases with the 
number of panels. 
20 The general results do not change when we use other criteria, such as Schwartz Criteria. 
21 Binder et al. (2003) show that GMM estimation of panel vector autoregressions based on orthogonality 
conditions breakdown if the underlying time series contain unit roots.   35
Appendix table 1: IPS Panel Unit Root Test Results 
Variable  t -statistic 
Active expenditures/GDP  -2.97*** 
 (0.0001) 
Passive expenditures/GDP  -2.79*** 
 (0.0001) 
Real active expenditures per capita  -2.78*** 
 (0.0001) 
Real passive expenditures per capita  -2.88*** 
 (0.0001) 














Portfolio investment  -2.69*** 
 (0.0001) 
Migration -2.34*** 
  (0.0003) 
Note:  
a)  ****, ** and * represent rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively; 
b)  All variables are de-trended prior to the unit root test for consistency, 
i.e., the IPS panel unit root test is based on the model with an 
intercept; 
c)  Values in the parentheses are p-values and are obtained from 
stochastic simulations with 100,000 replications. 
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Appendix table 2.  Sensitivity Analysis 
  Expenditures/GDP  Real Expenditures per capita  Active/LMP Expenditures 
 
  Active  Passive  Active  Passive  Active% 
Active (-1)    DK, FN, SW *       
Passive (-1)         
Active/LMP (-1)         
Tax/Budget effects 
UR (-1)    FN, FR, GE, IR, JA, 
NL, NW, SW, SZ 
# 
  DK 
#   
Debt (-1)  BE, CA, DK, FN, IR, 
SW * 
  CA, DK, SW *     
Dependency ratio (-1)  IR, NL, NW *    DK, FR *  AL, AU, BE, CA, FN, FR, 
GE, IR, JA, SW, SZ, US * 
DK * 
Exposure/Insider & Wage effects 
DUR (-1)  DK,FN, FR, IR, SW *  DK *  DK,  IR,  NL,  NW, 
SW, UK * 
  
Union (-1)   FN  *      SZ 
# 
Globalisation 
Openness (-1)  FR, GE, IR 
#    FR 
#     




#   
Portfolio investment (-1)  FN 
#        
Migration (-1)      SW 
#   
Politics 
Left (-1)  DK 
#     BE, SW 
#   
Note: # denotes that coefficient became statistically significant when one of the countries listed was deleted from the sample; * denotes that coefficient became 
statistically insignificant when one of the countries listed was deleted from the sample.   37
Appendix table 3. Determinants of Share of Active Spending 
Stratified by EU countries and Non-EU countries 
 
  All countries  EU countries  Non-EU countries 
Constant -0.001  0.0002  -0.007* 
 (0.001)  (0.0008)  (0.004) 
Active/LMP  (-1)  0.76*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 
  (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) 
Tax/Budget effects 
UR (-1)  0.00003  0.008***  -0.0007 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Debt  (-1)  0.002*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 
 (0.0006)  (0.002)  (0.0008) 
Dependency ratio (-1)  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02 
  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.03) 
Exposure/Insider & Wage effects 
DUR (-1)  -0.01***  -0.005*  -0.02*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) 
Union  (-1)  -0.0003 -0.0005 0.01 
 (0.002)  (0.0009)  (0.003) 
Globalisation 
Openness (-1)  0.0002  0.0008***  -0.003 
  (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.002) 
FDI (-1)  -0.28  0.11  -0.01 
  (0.23) (0.13) (0.25) 
Portfolio investment (-1)  0.09  0.007  0.29 
 (0.07)  (0.025)  (0.37) 
Migration  (-1)  -0.005* -0.0007 -0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.0008)  (0.005) 
Politics 
Left  (-1)  0.0001 0.0001 -0.009** 
 (0.003)  (0.0002)  (0.004) 
Diagnostic tests 
b) 
Sargan statistic (p-value)  177.9 (1.00)  60.24 (1.00)  69.40 (1.000) 
AR(1) -2.41*  -1.44  -2.19** 
AR(2)  -0.54 -0.34 -0.37 
Notes: 
a)  Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote rejection of null of zero restriction 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively; 
b)  Sargan statistic tests over-identifying restrictions (asymptotically chi-squared distributed).  AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation (asymptotically standard normally 
distributed). 